The Bandra magistrate’s court has awarded the custody of Faisal Khan to his father Tahir Hussain.
For those unfamiliar with the case, Faisal had approached the court a month ago accusing his brother Aamir Khan of forcible confinement. He had been made a prisoner, he said, and he would rather be alone or with his father than return to Aamir. Aamir had responded that Faisal suffers from schizophrenia-affected psychosis, a claim which was supported by the doctor’s reports, and had argued that he continue to have Faisal’s custody in the interest of the latter’s well-being. Today’s judgement by the court dismisses Aamir’s petition but directs that the father will now have custody.
I have mixed feelings about the judgement. On the one hand, I am glad that the court did not direct Faisal to be returned against his will to Aamir. However, from the news reports it appears that Faisal wanted to be a free man, and being put under the care of his father was his second-best option, perhaps something he put forth to escape being sent back to his former state. If that is the case, why should his freedom be denied?
My position is that involuntary custody in such an instance can be justified for only one reason- to prevent the person from harming others. The medical report says that Faisal’s illness “may affect mood” and make him prone to acting “irrationally”. Nowhere does it suggest that Faisal is dangerous or violent. He is just more likely than you or me to have unconventional thoughts and behaviour. Is it right for society to make a value judgement on his case and lock him up? A century ago, homosexuality was considered a mental disorder and “patients” were forcibly treated at psychiatric hospitals. Indeed, mental disorders, to paraphrase Thomas Szasz, are best viewed as a kind of social construction, created by society’s concept of what constitutes normality and abnormality. (To clarify, my argument is not that mental conditions are non-existent but rather that the set of conditions that are deemed ‘disorders’ are a function of social convention). As long as the person is not harming others, do we have a right to restrict his fundamental freedoms because his opinions, values or actions do not conform to our notions of correctness?
Newer posts on this topic:
(Dec 18, 2007) Who’s afraid of Faisal Khan?;
(Feb 17, 2008) Faisal gets his freedom finally.
I dunno how severe a schizophrenia this is.
Another rationale behind these kind of legal practices is that the patient’s capacity to judge what is the best way to heal himself might be impaired and might further contribute to the illness. So, it is essential for the health of the patient that he be forced against his will.
This is called involuntary commitment and is practiced all over the world. It is a bit controversial of course.
“Another rationale behind these kind of legal practices is that the patient’s capacity to judge what is the best way to heal himself might be impaired and might further contribute to the illness. So, it is essential for the health of the patient that he be forced against his will. ”
And so we are supposed to decide on behalf of the patient? How can we judge what is “best” for someone else? For instance, if I have a sickness tomorrow and I refuse to see the doctor- does that justify someone else taking over my decisions to prevent my health from deteriorating? What if I go on a spate of outrageous spending that would be considered irrational by the overwhelming majority of the population?
Think about it. Mental illness is essentially what society considers abnormal. It is, in a crucial way, a value judgement. Going a bit back in time, a homosexual was often involuntarily committed with precisely the kind of justification that you offer.
I believe that nothing justifies taking over another person’s freedom (if no crime is involved). Least of all considerations that override his wishes for “his own good”. If I want to hurt myself, or take decisions which (in others’ eyes) are self-harming, I should be allowed to do so. I am fundamentally against involuntary commitment, especially in cases of perceived ‘mental disorder’ where the individual is of no danger to others.
Involuntary commitment is one of the most abused practices in history. It has frequently involved the most inhuman methods – have you watched “One flew over the cuckoo’s nest”? Also you should read up about how it has been an effective tool for political imprisonment , for instance applied frequently in Soviet Russia against writers and artists with dangerous ‘ideas’.
Guns don’t kill, people do. Abuse of something doesn’t make it wrong. It’s the people who used involuntary commitment wrongly that were wrong not the concept of it.
Mental illness is not anymore “what society considers abnormal”. By extension, even bird flu could be called just “what society considers abnormal”.
There were days when we didn’t know much about the human brain and psychiatry was more or less a pseudo science. We have left that era way far behind.
Psychiatry is pretty much proper science now. We know that there is a dopamine circuit and a serotonin circuit in the brain and we know that these can be manipulated by SSRI’s. We know that a suicidal person with clinical depression has impaired judgement and so does a severe case of schizophrenia (seen the exorcism of Emily Rose). We know that a person with alziemers disease or retrogade amnesia can’t give consent and we the society have to take their decisions for them. There is a definite case to be made for involuntary commitment.
Of course, there is a question of where the line is to be drawn, but expert testimony and objective criteria sound good enough to me. If it’s implemented badly, improve the implementation but don’t throw the baby out with the bath water.
Szasz had it wrong. Just like science is not the rule of the scientists, pharmacy is no rule of the doctors.
Yes, I agree that psychiatry is a more proper science now. We know more about the brain than we did before. I never claimed that Szasz had everything right.
However the fact that we know which chemicals are involved in different moods does not mean that it is ok to limit the freedoms of those in whom these chemicals occur in a different proportion than the rest of the population. Indeed, with further advance in medical sciences it will probably possible to give much more refined criteria of various abnormalities. We already have some idea (and it will no doubt become more precise with time) which genes which lead to homosexual dispositions, which virus cause bird flu and what concentration of chemicals lead to schizophrenia. But these are merely refinements of what we already know -differences exist. Indeed, take *any* mental condition that is socially abnormal and I am sure that it will be (one day) possible to give a biochemical desription of it. Does that mean those with these differences have less of a right to freedom? Some people take the craziest risks in life. That makes them happy. I am sure there is a genetic/biochemical way to idenitfy them (at least broadly). That does not mean they deserve to be committed.
You are right that expert testimony is (usually) good in identifying a particular condition, like clinical depression. However in no way does it follow from there that action against such people need to be taken against their will. How much brain ‘malfunction’ deserves involuntary commitment is *not* a scientific question. It would be a scientific question only if the criterion for involuntary commitment is specified. Once the criterion is agreed upon, science can specify means of identifying such
individuals.
In other words I am talking about the ethical basis for involuntary commitment. My fundamental point is that this criterion in the case of involuntary commitment case should be “imminent danger of harming some one else”. I do not agree to coerced medical administration upon someone who is not a danger to others, except for the most extreme cases of impaired mental abilities, e.g. a grown up who is like a four month old baby. So, in my book it is morally abhorent to commit someone who has ‘delusions’ or who is ‘clinically depressed’ but can express himself (and in particular his wishes) coherently, and is of no danger to others. The fact that the dopamine balance in his brain is different from mine or that his judgement with regard to certain things might vary from mine (which reminds me, some of the greatest mathematicians, artists and musicians of the past were identified as either schizophrenic or clinically depressed) does not make his wishes any less sacred.
Similarly, I believe those who decide to commit suicide have the right to do so. They are exercising their right to do what they want with their bodies (in my book, one of the most sacred rights that a person has) There is absolutely no basis for their involuntary commitment, though perhaps there is some basis for a very short-term restrainment if they are ‘caught in the act’ – merely to ensure it is a well thought out decision on their part. I believe I am a rational person and let me say this now – if at any point in my life I decide that its continuance is not worthwhile, I’ll take my life. I’ll be exercising a basic right. And no one should be put in a mental institution for wanting to do so.
Related post in aother blog:
Two faces of fate
Excerpt from the above post’s comment thread:
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This thread is now closed.
[...] Also read my earlier post: The dad, the brother and schizophrenia [...]
[...] have been following the Faisal case since the news broke- click here and here for my previous posts. This judgement is a cause of joy to me and all others who love [...]